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TRADING THE OCEANS: THE BRAVE “NEW” 
WORLD OF SEAFOOD FUTURES CONTRACTS 
Nicholas Boston1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Financial markets are like the mirror of mankind. It is not the fault 
of the mirror if it reflects our blemishes as clearly as our beauty.”2  With 
the United States still attempting to recover from a financial crisis 
brought on, in part, by financial ingenuity and the relatively unforeseen 
risks emanating from “new” financial products,3 developing the idea of 
seafood futures contracts into another product that theoretically could 
cause market turmoil, may be met with a less than enthusiastic embrace. 
Although bowing to the urge to disregard the potential benefits for fear 
of the potential side effects might at first seem the prudent reaction, there 
are some considerable benefits to creating seafood futures contracts. 
Such contracts have the potential to influence an increase in seafood 
consumption and fishermen profitability, while enhancing market 
efficiency, decreasing waste, and limiting volatile price swings. With so 
much potential the question must be raised: “Why don’t seafood futures 
contracts already exist?” The answer is that they do exist,4 did exist,5 and, 
if the economic incentives are realized, could again exist in the United 
States in the near future.  
Part II of this Comment reviews forward and futures contracts in the 
United States and focuses on the creation and use of plywood, shrimp, 
                                            
 1. Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2013. 
 2. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 358 (2008). 
 3. WILLIAM COHEN, HOUSE OF CARDS – A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS 
ON WALL STREET 9 (2009). 
 4. Fresh salmon futures contracts are currently traded in Norway. Gunnvald Grønvik, 
A Norwegian Salmon Derivatives Market Has Made It, 41 SWISS DERIVATIVES REVIEW 
14 (2009). 
 5. Shrimp futures were traded on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE) until 
2000. Dwight R. Sanders & Mark R. Manfredo, The White Shrimp Futures Market: 
Lessons In Contract Design and Marketing, 18 AGRIBUSINESS 505, 506 (2002). 
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and salmon futures contracts. Part III of this Comment examines futures 
contracts under U.S. law. Part IV of this Comment analyzes the potential 
benefits and drawbacks of seafood futures contracts. Finally, Part V 
focuses on how seafood futures contracts could be created and 
implemented. 
II.  FUTURES CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  What Are Forward and Futures Contracts? 
“[D]erivative[s] [are] financial instrument[s] or contract[s] between 
two parties, the value of which is based upon an underlying asset.”6  
Having existed in some form for thousands of years,7 derivatives are 
essentially “instruments for transferring risks”8 that, in some respects, are 
similar to insurance,9 and include by definition, forward, futures, 
options,10 and swaps.11   
Forward and futures contracts are agreements between parties to 
purchase and deliver a specific asset, for a specified price, at an 
established time in the future.12  Forward contracts are customizable, 
individualized contracts that must result in an instrument or asset being 
delivered.13 Similar to forward contracts, futures contracts are 
standardized contracts with fixed terms and conditions set by an 
                                            
 6. David P. Cluchey, The Financial Crisis And The Response Of The United States: 
Will Dodd-Frank Protect US From The Next Crisis? in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: 
FRENCH AND AMERICAN REPONSES – PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 FRANCO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL SEMINAR 201, 208 (Martin A. Rogoff et al eds., 2011) available at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1831661. 
 7. The use of derivatives dates back to 2000 BC. RANDALL DODD, FINANCIAL POLICY 
FORUM DERIVATIVE STUDY CENTER, DERIVATIVES MARKETS: SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY 
IN U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS 2 (rev. 2004), available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/ 
fpfspr8.pdf.  
 8. DON M. CHANCE, ESSAYS IN DERIVATIVES: RISK-TRANSFER TOOLS AND TOPICS 
MADE EASY 367 (2nd ed. 2008). 
 9. One party generally pays another party a premium in exchange for taking on some 
form of risk.  
 10. Options are “agreements granting the holder the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy or sell something at a specified price on or before a specified future date.” Alireza M. 
Gharagozlou, Unregulable: Why Derivatives May Never Be Regulated, 4 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269, 273 (2010). 
 11. Swaps are “agreements to exchange future cash flows, where the amounts to be 
exchanged are based on a future variable.” Id. 
 12. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 105.  
 13. Id. 
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exchange, are traded on exchanges, but do not require settlement by 
physical delivery.14  
Forward contracts were established by the Chicago Board of Trade 
in 1848.15 Originally called “to arrive” contracts, the purpose of the 
private contracts was to allow farmers to space out the time between 
harvesting grain and bringing grain to a market to be sold.16  These early 
forward contracts “fixed the terms of sale in advance of the time of 
delivery,”17 thereby helping to prevent seasonal supply gluts and 
shortages that resulted in violent price swings.18  This provided farmers 
with a set price for their grain that “smooth[ed] pricing”19 and helped end 
users, primarily corporations, limit their “exposure to price change.”20  
The protection from adverse price change afforded farmers the 
opportunity to plan their crops in advance based upon which future 
prices were available.21  Eventually, forward contracts evolved from 
over-the-counter (“OTC”) individualized contracts into standardized, 
transferable, futures contracts traded between market participants.22  
Futures contracts first appeared at the Chicago Board of Trade in 
1865.23  These public, standardized contracts, which are now regulated, 
are fungible, and thus allow for the trading of contracts between parties.24  
Futures contracts make participation in a commodity market easier by 
reducing the costs of participation; this is because they provide for 
quantity and quality of the product, as well as location, time, and method 
of delivery.25 Unlike a forward contract, futures contracts have 
individualized terms and conditions that are not negotiated. This 
development made hedging and speculation possible.  
                                            
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 4.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith  Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357 (1982). 
 18. ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT 77 (2010). 
 19. Beverly Goodman, Regulators Throw Funds a Hot Potato, BARRON’S, Nov. 7. 
2011, at 37. 
 20. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 21. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 18, at 78. 
 22. Yuval Millo, Making Things Deliverable: The Origins of Index Based Derivatives, 
MARKET DEVICES 200 (2007). 
 23. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 24. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 25. ALLEN B. PAUL, RICHARD G. HEIFNER & JOHN W. HELMUTH, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., 
FARMERS’ USE OF FORWARD CONTRACTS AND FUTURES MARKETS 6 (1976) [hereinafter 
PAUL]. 
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“The main economic function of futures (contracts) is to provide a 
means of hedging” an “existing risk of price movement [by] using 
derivatives as a means of reducing that risk.”26  Hedging allows farmers 
to decide which crops to plant based upon futures contract prices.  
Hedging also allows end users, like food and canning companies, to plan 
around the acquisition cost of a commodity required for production. 
These companies can buy a futures contract (long) to protect against a 
future increase in cash market prices in a given commodity. “Mak[ing] 
financial planning much easier,”27 a farmer could theoretically sell 
(short) a futures contract in a given underlying commodity at a price the 
farmer found acceptable. He could then offset that sale by selling the 
commodity in the cash market at some desirable point in the future.28  
Profits (or losses) from the sale (short) of the futures contract offset (to a 
certain extent29) profits or losses incurred from the sale of the commodity 
in the cash market.30  In addition to being economically beneficial to 
hedgers, futures contracts also create the need for an additional market 
participant, the speculator.31   
With the rise of commodity prices in 2008, the word “speculator” in 
today’s lexicon has a negative connotation, possibly resulting from 
politicians and the media’s use of the word as a scapegoat to explain the 
painful prices consumers encounter at the gas pump.32 However, 
                                            
 26. KEITH REDHEAD, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO FUTURES, 
FORWARDS, OPTIONS AND SWAPS 3-4 (1997). See also Richard L. Sandor, Innovation By 
An Exchange: A Case Study Of The Development Of The Plywood Futures Contract, 16 
J.L. & ECON. 119 (1973).  
 27. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 21. 
 28. The “cash” market is any market where the delivery of a purchased good occurs 
immediately upon payment. JOSE M. GABILONDO, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, CORPORATE FINANCE: DEBT EQUITY, AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR 
INTERMEDIARIES 697 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter CORPORATE FINANCE]. 
 29. See infra note 77. 
 30. MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE, EXAMINING FUTURES AND OPTIONS 4, available 
at http://www.mgex.com/documents/MGEXFuturesOptions12-07.pdf. 
 31. “Speculators buy and sell derivatives simply to make profit, not to reduce risk.” 
REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 3-9. 
 32. See Doug McKelway & The Associated Press, Obama Eyes Speculators for 
Rising Gas Prices, as Other Factors Play Role, FOX NEWS, Apr. 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/22/obama-form-task-force-tackle-rising-gas-
prices/#ixzz1iyATF5v8; see also Charles Riley, Americans Blame Oil Companies, 
Speculators For Prices, CNN MONEY, May 9, 2011, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
2011/05/09/news /economy/gas_prices_poll/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). The 
word speculator historically possessed a negative connotation that likely derived from the 
perceived immoral and risky activities of speculators. This perception was reflected in the 
original Congressional purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act, which was to limit 
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speculators actually provide a vital function in futures contract markets 
by providing liquidity and accurate pricing.33  Without speculators who 
are willing to be long price risk, a hedger might not be able to find a 
market participant willing to accept additional risk.34  As speculators 
entered the futures contract market and provided liquidity, market 
participants gradually became able to buy and sell contracts without 
actually owning a commodity.35 Instead of taking delivery of a 
commodity at the time and place specified by a futures contract, 
participants simply purchased an offsetting contract that resulted in no 
physical commodity changing hands.36  Whereas, end users seek to lock 
in prices and contain costs, speculators step in and profit by attempting to 
predict price direction.37  Thus, speculators take on the risk that prices for 
a commodity might move in the opposite direction, while hedgers enter 
into these transactions to reduce price risk.38  Should a speculator guess 
                                                                                                  
certain activities of speculators. See Lynn A. Stout, Why The Law Hates Speculators: 
Regulation and Private Ordering in The Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 
722 (1999); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6a (2010). Furthermore, the use of 
speculators as scapegoats could also be partially explained by Moral Panic Theory. 
CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 28, at 14 (analyzing the reaction by the public “to a 
perceived threat to a fundamental social interest (like gasoline pricing) by invoking a 
deviant to blame for the perceived threat” (speculators, foreign oil interests, etc.)). 
 33. REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 3-9; CHANCE, supra note 8, at 18.  
 34. REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 3-9. 
 35. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, THE ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF FUTURES 
MARKETS AND HOW THEY WORK, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/ 
EducationCenter/economicpurpose (last visited Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter C.F.T.C.]. 
 36. CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 28, at 700. 
 37. PAUL, supra note 25, at 4. 
 38. Although speculation might sound like gambling (common law banned 
speculation on food prices), Jerry W. Markam & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom The Bell 
Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors And The Growth of ECNS, 33 J.CORP. L. 
871 n.34 (2008) [hereinafter For Whom The Bell Tolls], the Supreme Court found in 
Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., that futures contracts  are not gambling 
transactions as they are legally enforceable contracts that require delivery of a good. See 
Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249-50 (1905). With 
settlement by delivery representing between less than one percent, Dennis W. Carlton, 
Futures Markets: Their Purpose, Their History, Their Growth, Their Successes and 
Failures, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 237, 239 (1984), and two percent of all futures 
contracts, S. Aaron Hegde, An Economic History of the Failure of Broiler Futures, AM. 
AGRICULTURAL ECON. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 7, 20 (2004), the Christie Grain holding and 
rationale appears to be partially undermined. For an analysis of the distinction between 
futures contracts and gambling, see Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How 
Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096 
(2000).  
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wrong, market participants could theoretically cause market turmoil by 
failing to fulfill their contractual obligations, thereby resulting in default.  
Forward and futures contracts both contain the problem of 
counterparty risk. In day-to-day activities, market participants “are 
exposed not merely to their counterparties, but also to potential problems 
at their counterparties’ counterparties, and so on.”39  Should a market 
participant on the other side of a transaction default, the injured party 
might have to go out and buy a commodity on the open market to satisfy 
its needs. In resorting to a lawsuit for breach of contract, an injured party 
may recover from a non-bankrupt counterparty, but the recovery may 
occur years after the need for a commodity was required.  In the case of a 
counterparty bankruptcy, derivatives contracts are exempted from the 
automatic stay.40  This allows for an injured party to offset or liquidate a 
contract after bankruptcy is declared,41 seize any collateral that was 
posted,42 and determine the extent of damages from the transaction that 
can be sought.43  
In 1925, seeking to limit counterparty risk, clearinghouses were 
created for futures contracts.44  Requiring margin and/or collateral to be 
posted, clearinghouses became parties to each and every contract, which 
allowed them to net outstanding contracts45 and provide a “[c]redit 
guarantee that assures each party . . . will incur no credit loss.”46  
Smoothing the trading of commodity futures contracts and guaranteeing 
performance, commodity exchange clearinghouses basically eliminated 
counterparty default risk for market participants trading in standardized 
contracts.47 
                                            
 39. JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL – THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 342 
(2009).  
 40. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (2010). 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 561 (2010). 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17) (2010). 
 43. Frank C. Puleo, Derivatives: A Banker’s Primer, 113 BANKING L.J. 768, 781-82 
(1996).  
 44. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 105.  
 45. This allows for the offsetting of contracts to buy a specific commodity against 
contracts to sell that particular commodity. PAUL, supra note 25, at 6. 
 46. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 105. 
 47. Except of course for the counterparty risk presented by the clearinghouse itself. 
Gunnvald Grønvik, On Commodity Derivatives and The Norwegian Initiatives to Create 
a Fish Derivatives Market, ECONOMIC BULLETIN 30 (2008), http://www.norgesbank.no/ 
Upload/67504/On_ commodity_derivatives_EB1_2008.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC 
BULLETIN]. However, the risk of default of a clearinghouse is very small. CORPORATE 
FINANCE, supra note 28, at 701 n.2. 
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Commodity exchanges were granted a monopoly to house and 
facilitate the trading of futures contracts under the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) interpretation of the Commodity 
Exchange Act.48 This monopoly continued until the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) modified the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1974.49  Exchanges provide organization, rules, and 
oversight of commodity trading,50 as well as selective requirements for 
members that promote trust and, thus, trading.51 “[T]rad[ing] 
standardized contracts through a centralized structure that is organized to 
promote liquidity and to mutualize credit risk,”52 exchanges allow for 
transparent price discovery and they reduce search and negotiation costs 
for producers and end users.53  
“The primary purpose of the commodity exchanges . . . was to permit 
hedgers to purchase and sell cash commodities and offset risks associated 
with operating businesses in the underlying cash commodities.”54  To do 
this, futures contracts have to accurately reflect cash market pricing, 
which is accomplished through liquidity.55 If enough market participants 
trade on the information available, and arbitrageurs step in and “make 
profit from relative mispricing”56 between the cash market and the 
futures contracts, then a reflective, functioning market can operate. 
Liquidity is the biggest advantage for a futures market over a forward 
market as the standardization of terms makes the trading of contracts 
cheaper and the use of a clearinghouse limits non-performance risk.57 
Liquidity is so important in futures contract trading that “commodity 
exchanges encouraged floor trading58 because [it] added liquidity to the 
                                            
 48. See William L. Stein, The Exchange Trading Requirement of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 473, 490-91 (1988).  
 49. Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. Law No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000). See infra Part III.A (providing more information about this regulatory change). 
 50. PAUL, supra note 25, at 5. 
 51. For Whom The Bell Tolls, supra note 38, at 885-86. 
 52. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 18, at 21.  
 53. “Price discovery describes the process by which trading in a market incorporates 
new information and market participants expectations into asset prices.” Id. at 58.  
 54. For Whom The Bell Tolls, supra note 38, at 871. 
 55. “When cash and futures prices do not converge, then the option to liquidate a 
position by delivery may lose its value. Consequently, this may result in an ineffective 
hedge.” Sandor, supra note 26, at 131.  
 56. REDHEAD, supra note 26, at 3-9.  
 57. See Carlton, supra note 38, at 241.  
 58. Floor trading for securities was banned in 1934 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) as the SEC believed that floor traders had an unfair advantage over 
other traders. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 
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market.”59  Electronic trading has now largely removed the need for floor 
trading to increase liquidity, allowing futures trading to become a global 
enterprise undertaken via internet connection.60 The mobility of 
electronic trading also allows regulatory choice on the part of market 
participants and those trying to create new derivatives contracts.  No 
longer restricted by national borders, derivative trading has a history of 
moving jurisdiction to jurisdiction, based upon law change and the 
degree of regulatory control.61 
B.  Case Studies in the Creation of Futures Contracts 
Seafood futures contracts are a combination of a product that is well 
known and has been used for over one-hundred years in the United States 
(futures contracts), with a commodity and industry relatively alien to 
financial products. Futures contracts have the potential to revolutionize 
the fishing business. Instead of relying upon the ebb and flow of price 
movements to determine profitability, fishermen could lock in 
profitability before first stepping foot onto their boats. As fish farming 
puts downward pressure on pricing for fish that are captured,62 the 
                                                                                                  
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 228-43 
(1982) (emphasis added). Commodities are not securities and thus do not fall under SEC 
jurisdiction. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(1) (2010). 
 59. For Whom The Bell Tolls, supra note 38, at 877. 
 60. Id. at 896. 
 61. “When Japan tried to restrict both listed futures and OTC derivatives tied to the 
Tokyo stock exchange, the futures business moved to Singapore and the OTC business 
moved to New York and London.” Bryan H. Booth, Prudence or Paranoia: Considering 
Stricter Regulation of the International Over-The-Counter Derivatives Market, 5 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INTL L. 499, 523 (1995). Furthermore, when the CFTC and the SEC were 
engaged in a jurisdiction battle over single stock futures contracts, the regulatory 
uncertainty allowed South Africa to quietly become the home of the “largest single stock 
futures exchange” in the world. Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC & CFTC – A Clash 
of Cultures, 78 U. CINN. L. REV. 537, 597 (2009). Alan Greenspan summed up this 
financial market mobility when he said at a Congressional hearing considering the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, that “[i]f the Congress cannot work it 
out, foreigners will. It is not a question of whether or not there will be [trading of a 
particular derivative, but] . . . only: traded where?” The Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000: Hearing on S.2697 Before the Comm. on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry and the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 106th 
Cong. 29 (2000) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System). 
 62. Justin Rohrlich, A Futures Market In Fish Is Inevitable: The Question Is When?, 
(June 29, 2010), http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/aquaculture-fish-
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capture fishing industry should embrace seafood forward and futures 
contracts as one way that the industry can help protect itself. To gain an 
understanding of how seafood futures contracts would work and what 
attributes of past contracts resulted in their subsequent success or failure, 
past and present uses of futures contracts must be examined. 
1.  Plywood – Evolution of a Futures Contract 
Created in December of 1969 by the Chicago Board of Trade 
(“CBOT”),63 the plywood futures contract came into existence even 
before the creation of the CFTC.64 The invention of a new futures 
contract occurs in a fluid, ever-changing process that, in the case of the 
plywood futures contract, took seventeen months.65  Starting in the 
research and development phase, the idea to create the new contract, 
combined with the exposed need uncovered by price volatility in 
plywood prices, began the process that led to a feasibility study.66 
Consulting industry members about the idea, researching supply and 
demand, and educating possible market participants about the benefits of 
the futures contracts, the feasibility study concluded with a report 
recommending moving forward with a contract.67 The second step of the 
process was for a first draft of the futures contract to be created utilizing 
the details of the report, and once this was written, possible problems had 
to be gamed out by simulating the use of the contracts in a trading 
setting. Eventually, moving to formal approval of the contract by the 
CBOT’s Board of Directors, and then by the membership of the CBOT, 
the contract began to be traded.68 Throughout the entire process, the 
contract was changed and modified to meet the needs of the market 
participants that were utilizing the contract by a committee specifically 
created to oversee and ensure the smooth implementation and trading of 
                                                                                                  
farming-recirculating-aquaculture-aquaculture/6/29/2010/id/28970 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013). 
 63. Sandor, supra note 26, at 120. 
 64. The CFTC was created in 1974 by the Commodity Exchange Act. Commodity 
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2010). This is particularly important as plywood futures 
contracts were unregulated until the Commodity Exchange Act of 1974 went into effect. 
Although unregulated at the time of creation, the CBOT imposed position limits and strict 
rules for trading on the plywood futures contracts that were consistent, if not more strict, 
than regulations placed on regulated contracts. Sandor, supra note 26, at 135. 
 65. Sandor, supra note 26, at 131. 
 66. Id. at 127.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Before a futures contract could be traded today, an additional step of CFTC 
approval is generally required. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2010). 
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the contract.69  Each step of the process to create a futures contract must 
be questioned.70  With a high failure rate among new futures contracts, 
adhering to past practices, although not a guarantee of future success, can 
be used to guide the development of sustainable contracts.71 
2.  Shrimp Futures Contracts 
Shrimp were first thinly traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(“CME”) during the years between 1964 and 1966.72  In 1993, the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange (“MGE”) introduced the “first exchange-
traded . . . [futures] contract”73 aimed at allowing shrimp farmers to 
hedge their exposure to shrimp price-change risk. Relatively ignored by 
most major end users of shrimp and shrimp farmers alike, the futures 
contracts stopped trading in 2000 after seven years of low trading 
volume.74 To gain a better understanding of the challenges facing the re-
introduction of seafood futures contracts in the United States, the failure 
of the shrimp futures contracts must be analyzed. 
There are many necessary elements to a successful75 futures 
contract.76 Among these elements, the most important are a transparent 
cash market where market participants can obtain pricing information for 
                                            
 69. Sandor, supra note 26, at 130. 
 70. Some of the important questions to be asked include: Who is going to benefit? 
Does this satisfy the needs of those market participants that will trade in the contract? Is 
the contract fair? What are the weaknesses within the contract that could be exploited? 
 71. “Forty percent of the futures contracts introduced in the United States are delisted 
prior to their fifth year of trading,” Sanders & Manfredo, supra note 5, at 506, and “most 
new contracts fail within ten years of introduction.” B. Wade Brorsen & N’Zue F. 
Fofana, Success and Failure of Agricultural Futures Contracts, 19 J. OF AGRIBUSINESS 
129 (2001) (citing Carlton, supra note 38).  
 72. Josué Martínez-Garmendia & James L. Anderson, Hedging Performance of 
Shrimp Futures Contracts With Multiple Deliverable Grades, 19 J. OF FUTURES MARKETS 
957, 960 (1999). 
 73. Sanders & Manfredo, supra note 5, at 505. 
 74. Id. at 506. 
 75. Successful futures contracts are typically defined as those with high trading 
volumes, as high trading volumes indicate a liquid market and result in more transaction 
fees for exchanges. Hegde, supra note 38, at 25.  
 76. Sanders & Manfredo, supra note 5, at 507 (listing some necessary elements of 
successful futures contracts that include: “economic necessity (of the contract) . . . 
homogeneity of the commodity, a large and well-defined underlying cash market that 
lends itself to standardization, . . . price volatility, a competitive marketplace,  economic 
need (i.e. hedging demand), the ability to attract speculators, . . . and the free flow of 
public information”). 
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immediate delivery,77 sufficient liquidity to provide for a smooth 
functioning market, and a properly designed futures contract.78  One of 
the factors contributing to the failure of shrimp futures was lack of a 
single, large cash market for shrimp in the United States, let alone in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.79  “Effective futures markets should generate 
prices that express consciously-formed opinions on cash prices in the 
future, and should transmit that information throughout the marketing 
system in a timely manner.”80  Without a transparent cash market, price 
discovery and supply and demand information are not readily available, 
and this hinders futures markets by limiting a market participant’s ability 
to converge futures contract prices with cash market prices via arbitrage. 
Without the ability to base the purchase of future contracts on the pricing 
of the cash market, there is insufficient market participation in the futures 
contracts, the result of which is a lack of liquidity.  
Contract design also played a part in the demise of MGE shrimp 
futures contracts. The very nature of shrimp creates a contractual 
problem when trying to create a standardized contract. Without a 
commodity having “objectively quantifiable differences,”81 or 
homogeneity, it is very difficult to standardize and trade a contract 
delineated in that good. MGE tried to overcome the varying difference in 
                                            
 77. This is necessary to help determine the appropriate basis that should be built in to 
a futures contract. Basis is the sum of the storage costs, opportunity costs, and insurance 
costs of holding a commodity, CHANCE, supra note 8, at 26, and “is defined as the 
difference between the cash price and the futures price.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 
18, at 45. Although profits from the sale of a futures contract will theoretically offset 
losses incurred from the sale of the commodity in the cash market, this transaction might 
not recover basis costs. “The value of a futures contract on a commodity is based 
primarily on expected future spot prices and the storage costs of holding the particular 
commodity.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 18, at 77. Without a “[b]road and 
transparent cash market,” it is difficult to determine whether futures contract prices 
actually correspond to cash market pricing and thus, whether a hedging benefit can be 
derived from the futures contract (the original purpose of futures contracts), is called into 
question. Martínez-Garmendia & Anderson, supra note 72, at 988.  
 78. Sanders & Manfredo, supra note 5, at 507. 
 79. Id. at 508. 
 80. Fabio Mattos & Philip Garcia, Price Discovery in Thinly Traded Markets: Cash 
and Futures Relationships in Brazilian Agricultural Futures Markets 1, NCR-134 
CONFERENCE ON APPLIED COMMODITY PRICE ANALYSIS, FORECASTING, AND MARKET RISK 
MANAGEMENT 2004, available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19019/1/ 
cp04ma02.pdf. 
 81. See Martínez-Garmendia & Anderson, supra note 72, at 957-58. “Objectively 
quantifiable differences” must be present in a commodity so one unit can be interchanged 
with another. Such a standard indicates that each unit of the commodity is describable 
and the quality of the unit is not subjective.  Brorsen & Fofana, supra note 71, at 133-34. 
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shrimp by allowing for multiple sizes of shrimp to be delivered under a 
single futures contract, and pricing the difference in a delivery product 
with non-par premiums and discounts.82 These premiums and discounts, 
however, failed to rapidly change with the rising and falling prices of 
different sizes of shrimp traded at the MGE.83 Without certainty as to the 
size of the shrimp that is going to be delivered, a market participant who 
needs a certain size of shrimp can be left with a delivered product that 
fails to meet its needs, even though the initially purchased futures 
contract met the participant’s requirements.  
Opening up the opportunity for “price manipulation,” the MGE 
contracts built in favorable terms for sellers and for dispute resolution, 
but failed to recognize the basic reason why buyers would have utilized 
the contracts – to meet the demand of end users through proper hedging 
and/or delivery. It is as if the shrimp futures contracts were designed so 
that speculators could theoretically manipulate the price of one size count 
shrimp to make it beneficial for a seller to deliver non-par (i.e. another 
size count) shrimp. The disassociation between market prices for 
different shrimp sizes also presented the problem of ineffective hedging 
resulting from a lack of pricing correlation between shrimp sizes, 
possibly emanating from the different uses for different sizes of shrimp.84  
MGE shrimp futures failed because there was a lack of liquidity in 
the futures and futures option markets, there was a lack of transparency 
in the cash market for shrimp, and there were insufficient penalties for 
delivery of shrimp that failed to conform to the requirements of the 
contract.85  Furthermore, the role that fear and the costs of change to the 
status quo play in the viability of shrimp futures contracts must not be 
overlooked.  It is possible that with a profitable business, many industry 
participants feared that futures contracts might detract from their 
operations or encourage price competition that could decrease 
profitability.86  End users never fully accepted futures contracts as a way 
to hedge costs.  Instead, it is possible that many end-users purchased 
shrimp in the cash market and simply passed on the costs to consumers.87  
                                            
 82. Martínez-Garmendia & Anderson, supra note 72, at 961. 
 83. See id. at 962. 
 84. Id. at 987. 
 85. JAMES L. ANDERSON, THE INTERNATIONAL SEAFOOD TRADE 126 (2003). 
 86. See Roger W. Gray, Why Does Futures Trading Succeed or Fail: An Analysis of 
Selected Commodities, in 3 FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR 115, 119-20 (1966). 
 87. Dwight R. Sanders & Joost M. E. Pennings, They Trade Shrimp In Minneapolis? 
An Examination of the MGE White Shrimp Futures Contract, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NCR-134 CONFERENCE ON APPLIED COMMODITY PRICE ANALYSIS, FORECASTING, AND 
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Combined, the various problems with shrimp futures contracts raise 
serious questions as to the viability of new seafood futures contracts. 
3.  The “Norwegian Experiment”  
On April 26, 2007, Fish Pool ASA created fresh Atlantic salmon 
futures contracts cleared by NOS Clearing ASA to be traded in 
Norway.88  Just six months after launch, Fish Pool claimed that over 
$620,000,000 NOK in contract value had been traded in fresh salmon 
contracts.89  With a goal to expand from fresh salmon to other seafood 
futures contracts, and to graduate seafood futures contracts to the level of 
traditional futures contracts like corn or coffee,90 the “Norwegian 
experiment” can be looked to for guidance in considering the creation of 
seafood futures contracts in the United States.  
Norway is particularly well suited to be a location for trading fresh 
salmon futures contracts due to the country’s experience with derivatives 
markets and its position as the largest single producer of farm raised 
salmon in the world.91  Having grown accustomed to “non-traditional” 
contracts like electric power and freight shipping derivatives, market 
participants in Norway appear to have likewise accepted fresh salmon 
derivatives as a way to hedge their exposure to the volatility within fresh 
salmon cash market pricing.92 With a large cash market from which 
settlement prices can be derived and electronic trading that opens the 
contracts up for global trading activity, fresh salmon futures contracts 
were created within an environment ripe for the product.  Because 
futures products “have high failure rates and often contracts die soon 
after introduction,” every possible advantage must be considered.93  The 
success of salmon futures in a country surrounded by deliverable fresh 
salmon, signals one possible lesson that can be learned from Norway’s 
                                                                                                  
MARKET RISK MANAGEMENT 413, 419 (1999), http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/ 
nccc134/conf_1999/pdf/confp26-99.pdf. 
 88. Press Release, Fish Pool, Fish Pool is First to Launch Salmon Futures Clearing 
(Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.fishpool.eu/docs/190407Press_release_Clearing.pdf. 
 89. Press Release, Fish Pool, Salmon Exchange Fish Pool Has Passed Hundred 
Members (Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.fishpool.eu/docs/231007FP_PressRelease.pdf. 
 90. Norwegian Company to Launch Salmon Futures Clearing, ETF EXPRESS (Apr. 23, 
2007), http://www.etfexpress.com/2007/04/23/norwegian-clearing-house-first-launch-
salmon-futures-contracts. 
 91.  See Grønvik, supra note 4, at 14.  
 92. “The demand to hedge requires price fluctuations sufficiently large to give 
certainty about future prices an independent value of a sufficient size.” Id. at 15.  
 93. Carlton, supra note 38, at 268. 
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experience: even in an electronic age, location may matter and should be 
considered when creating new seafood futures contracts in the United 
States. 
III.  UNITED STATES LAW GOVERNING FUTURES CONTRACTS  
The nature of seafood94 presents considerable obstacles to creating 
and utilizing standardized seafood futures contracts. Creating contracts 
that account for seafood’s inherent lack of fungibility,95 and the 
possibility that a whole host of contracted delivery problems might 
occur,96 requires careful attention to contractual detail as well as an 
understanding of the law and regulations that govern the creation and use 
of futures contracts in the United States. 
A.  United States Financial Regulations 
Obtaining constitutional authority via the interstate commerce clause 
of the Constitution,97 “[t]he Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) . . .  has 
been aptly characterized as ‘a comprehensive regulatory structure to 
oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.’”98  Created in 
1974 as the exclusive regulatory authority for futures contracts,99 the 
CFTC took over and expanded the regulatory position previously held by 
the Secretary of Agriculture.100  CFTC jurisdiction101 is governed by the 
frequently amended CEA and includes all “contracts of sale102 of a 
                                            
 94. “Seafood is a disparate array of products encompassing literally hundreds of 
edible species that have little in common other than an aquatic origin. Collectively, 
seafood has perhaps the most diverse and complex microbiology of any food 
commodity.” Inspection of Seafood Products: Hearing Before The H. Comm. on 
Agriculture, Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry, 104th Cong. (1996), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115081.htm. 
 95. No two fish of the same species classification are exactly alike. 
 96. The nets and traps come back empty, a major storm destroys the fishing fleet, a 
fisherman gets sick, or his boat engine fails, all with the end result that a fisherman 
cannot satisfy the contract terms. 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 5 
(2010). 
 98. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 355-56 
(1982). 
 99. Millo, supra note 22, at 203. 
 100. Curran, 456 U.S. at 366. 
 101. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2010). 
 102. Contract of sale is defined as including “sales, agreements of sale, and agreements 
to sell.” Id. at § 1a (13). 
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commodity103 for future delivery.”104  Exempted from this definition, 
forward contracts were excluded from CFTC enforcement authority to 
prevent undue economic burden on commerce.105 According to numerous 
courts and the CFTC, to qualify for this exemption the parties to a 
forward contract must contemplate delivery of the commodity, have the 
ability to take delivery of the commodity,106 and intend to enter into a 
forward, not a disguised futures contract.107   However, in one of the most 
recent cases on whether a contract was a futures contract or a forward 
contract, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defined a futures contract 
in Zelener as a contract in which trading actually “‘occurs in “the 
contract,” not the commodity.’”108 Rejecting the CFTC supported totality 
of the circumstances test, the Zelener Court partially disposed of the 
prior framework that focused on the delivery requirement and identified 
several important characteristics of futures contracts109 as well as 
identified several characteristics of forward contracts.110  
Finding in Zelener that because foreign currency transactions were in 
unique amounts and the contracts were of unique timing (even though 
the contracts had similar terms), the contracts were not futures contracts 
                                            
 103. Commodity is defined as “all . . . goods and articles, except onions . . .  and 
motion picture box office receipts, . . . and all services, rights and interests . . . in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Id. at § 1a (9). 
 104. Future delivery is defined as “not includ[ing] any sale of any cash commodity for 
deferred shipment or delivery.”  Id. at § 1a (27). 
 105. See Policy Alternatives Relating to Agricultural Trade Options and Other 
Agricultural Risk-Shifting Contracts, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCReports/acag8 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 106. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co. Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 
F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 107. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Noble Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 
772 (9th  Cir. 1995) (“[B]oth parties [must] contemplate[] and inten[d] [to take] future 
delivery of the actual commodity.”).  
 108. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 109. Several important characteristics of futures contracts are:  that participants are 
actually buying or selling contracts, rather than commodities; that there be standardized 
terms; that each party’s obligation run to an intermediary, the clearing corporation;  that 
the clearing corporation eliminates the counterparty risk; that contracts become fungible 
via standardized terms and absence of counterparty-specific risk, this makes it possible to 
offset a contract; that all contracts expiring in a given month are identical; that each 
contract call for delivery of the same commodity, in the same place, at the same time.  
See id. at 865. 
 110. Forward contracts are contracts that call for the sale of a commodity, are not able 
to be offset because promises are not fungible, and are contracts for which delivery is not 
centralized. Id. at 865-66. 
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even though the obligations could be rolled forward every two days.111 
This case, although only court precedent in the Seventh Circuit, has 
drastically altered the “what is a futures contract” analysis.112 Although 
the “CFTC is not entitled to deference in its determination of whether an 
investment is a futures contract subject to CFTC jurisdiction or a forward 
contract that is not,” 113 the CFTC did not acquiesce to the Zelener ruling 
and reserves the right to bring further cases with similar fact patterns 
before the courts.  
Until the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000 (“CFMA”), every futures contract had to be approved for trading 
by the CFTC.114  The purpose of the CFMA is “to promote innovation for 
. . . derivatives and to reduce systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty 
in the markets for certain . . . derivatives transactions [and] to reduce 
systemic risk and provide greater stability to markets during times of 
market disorder.”115  Serving to deregulate portions of the derivatives 
market, the CFMA created “over-the-counter (OTC) markets for 
commodities futures and options.”116 The CFMA also created a tiered 
regulatory system that separated designated contract markets (“DCM”)117 
                                            
 111. Id. at 867. 
 112. In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and Eleventh 
Circuit also adopted the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and defined forward and futures 
contracts in a similar manner. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 322-25 (6th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit also recently identified 
characteristics of a forward contract which include: 
1) The primary subject of the contract is the commodity itself as opposed to 
packaging, marketing, shipping or other costs; 
2) The contract requires payment at a fixed price with delivery more than two 
days after the agreement; 
3) The quantity term and timing for delivery are fixed in the agreement when 
made; and 
4) There is no requirement for the contract to be traded on an exchange or 
otherwise in the financial markets. 
In re Nat’l Gas Distributors LLC v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 556 F.3d 247, 
259-60 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 113. PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 23 
(Supp. 2012) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309 (6th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 114. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2006); Stout, supra note 32, at 723.  
 115. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 116. CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 28, at 776. 
 117. “Designated contract markets are the traditional commodity exchanges” and are 
still regulated by the CFTC under the CFMA. Id. at 873. 
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from OTC derivative trading transactions by institutions118 and other 
“eligible commercial entities . . . including accredited investors as 
defined in Regulation D by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
under the Securities Act of 1933 (17 CFR 230.501(a)).119 
The CFMA, however, did not change how futures contracts were 
created or traded on DCMs.  The “CFTC [still] acts as a gatekeeper”120 
that must approve the use of new futures contracts.119 The CFTC futures 
contract application process results in considerable costs being incurred 
by an exchange when introducing a new product.121 Besides the filing fee 
for the review of the new market contract,122 the application itself 
requires the tedious inclusion of supply and demand, hedging usefulness, 
and manipulation prevention measure information that significantly 
increases the costs of filing.123 Despite the considerable new contract 
costs, the “first-to-trade” advantage can be very lucrative as “there is 
usually only one successful contract for each good and this is usually the 
first one to trade at substantial volume.”124 
The full extent of the changes imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act125 are 
not yet known.126 However, one of the Act’s main impacts on futures 
contracts is the strain imposed by the Act on the CFTC, which had its 
jurisdiction expanded to include swaps.127  Directed at establishing 
protocol for unwinding companies previously determined “too big to 
                                            
 118. OTC derivative trading between institutions is no longer subject to CFTC 
regulation under the CFMA. Id. 
 119. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a (11) (2010).  
 120. Stout, supra note 32, at 723. 
 121. Research and development of a new contract can involve many people including 
lawyers, experts, current employees, members of industry, and traders. The result is that 
innovation is not cheap. See generally Ronald W. Anderson, The Regulation of Futures 
Contract Innovations in the United States, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 297, 310-26 (1984) 
[hereinafter R. Anderson]. 
 122. Id. at 298-99. 
 123. Id. at 300. The application specifically requires “a cash market description [supply 
and demand], . . . analysis of the terms and conditions of the contract [fairness and 
deliverable supply], . . . an explanation of how the contract would fulfill an economic 
purpose [useful to hedgers], and . . . a public interest statement [manipulation 
prevention].” Id. 
 124. Id. at 324. 
 125. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).   
 126. The full extent of the ramifications of the Dodd-Frank Act will not be known until 
all the federal agencies involved have finished promulgating rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of the Act. See Cluchey, supra note 6 (analyzing the major parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act).  
 127. Goodman, supra note 19. 
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fail,”128 Dodd-Frank created substantial reporting requirements that 
increased the cost of regulatory compliance, not just for the commodities 
industry, but also increased the cost of CFTC enforcement.129 In this 
respect, the CEA already provided significant recordkeeping 
requirements for all registered entities, including DCM’s, by, among 
other provisions, requiring that complete trading records (an audit trail) 
are kept and available for inspection by the CFTC or the Department of 
Justice for a period of five years.130  Unlike forward contracts whose 
terms are dictated between individuals and founded on freedom of 
contract principals, futures contracts have many more restrictions 
emanating from their standardized nature and CFTC rules. 
B.  Contractual Details 
Although the CFTC imposes contractual design requirements that 
include the requirement that there is sufficient supply of a commodity to 
meet delivery,131 and undertakes a review of contractual terms to attempt 
to limit manipulation and protect retail purchasers of futures contracts, 
the standardization of commodity contracts has been largely 
accomplished and imposed by exchanges.132  After consulting lawyers, 
industry and market participants, and undertaking a feasibility study,133 
exchanges ultimately create the terms and conditions of a specific futures 
contract. These include the quantity, quality, and grade of a commodity, 
as well as the time, location, and whether settlement occurs through 
physical delivery134 or through cash settlement.135  Breach of contract 
                                            
 128. Cluchey, supra note 6, at 205-06. 
 129. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 
Fed. Reg. 36 612 (June 19, 2012) (detailing the additional costs of regulation imposed by 
the CFTC on seventeen designated contract markets). 
 130. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6g (2006). 
 131. Richard A. Shilts, Harvard Electricity Policy Group Market Power and Market-
Makers, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. GOV’T, 20-21, available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Shilts%2001-25-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 
2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Sandor, supra note 26, at 127. 
 134. Methods of physical delivery can include the mode of transportation or the 
transfer of a warehouse receipt.  Id. at 124. 
 135. Cash settlement is defined by the CFTC to be “[a] method of settling futures 
options and other derivatives whereby the seller (or short) pays the buyer (or long) the 
cash value of the underlying commodity or a cash amount based on . . . price according to 
a procedure specified in the contract.” Glossary: A Guide To The Language Of The 
Futures Industry, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/ 
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provisions that identify actions and non-actions of default, are also 
included in the event that a party fails to deliver an underlying 
commodity.  Once a futures contract is created, the contract must be 
simulated to identify problems and ways to manipulate terms, to make 
sure that the contract is attractive to both the industry and potential 
speculators.136  Modifying contractual terms to prevent one market 
participant from gaming the contract, exchanges must constantly review 
and evaluate how a particular future contract is being used and make 
changes to the contract to facilitate trading and liquidity.137  
IV.  BENEFITS & DRAWBACKS OF EXCHANGE  
TRADED FUTURES CONTRACTS 
Derivatives have the ability, as seen in the recent financial crisis, to 
entangle much of the financial establishment in a web of counterparty 
risk that presents the danger of mutually assured destruction. Even if a 
trade goes in a party’s favor, if the party on the other side of this zero-
sum game is unable to cover the loss (assuming OTC transaction), then 
the trade can result in both parties failing. Warren Buffett famously 
remarked, in a Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter, that “derivatives 
are financial weapons of mass destruction.”138  Contrary to this often 
cited quote, however, two years later, Buffet, acting on behalf of 
Berkshire Hathaway, entered into derivatives contracts that in 2009 
represented up to thirty-seven billion dollars in liability for Berkshire.139  
Although it is assumed that Buffett was speaking about one type of 
derivative contract and probably entering into other derivatives contracts 
with much more favorable attributes, the point is that even Warren 
Buffett, “the Oracle of Omaha,” recognizes the potential benefits of 
derivatives and realized that it was Berkshire Hathaway’s perceived self-
interest to enter into the voluntary transactions. 
The key that opens the lock within the financial markets is perceived 
self-interest. In the years before the financial crisis, then Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, pushed for deregulation believing that 
                                                                                                  
groups/public/@educationcenter/documents/file/cftcglossary.pdf  (last updated May 
2010). 
 136. Sanders & Pennings, supra note 87, at 413. 
 137. See Sandor, supra note 26, at 130. 
 138. Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to 
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. S’holders, 15 (Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf. 
 139. Buffett: Oops!, CNN MONEY (Aug. 13, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/13/ 
news/companies/buffett_berkshire_derivatives.reut/index.htm. 
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“[r]isks in financial markets, including derivatives markets, are . . . 
regulated by private parties”140 and that the invisible hand of the market 
would have a self-regulating effect.  After the financial crisis, Greenspan 
characterized the market failure as a “self-interest fail[ure].”141  Like 
Greenspan’s folly in advocating for deregulation, a root cause of the 
financial crisis, he has also punted his analysis of market participant 
motivation that led to the calamity. Self-interest did not fail as Greenspan 
argued, but in actuality, perceived self-interest failed. Blinded by short-
term interests, participants failed to understand the very real unintended 
consequences of their actions. Greenspan’s reliance on the self-
regulating effect of free markets did not take into account that actual self-
interest and perceived self-interest are not necessarily the same thing. 
The end result was that leverage, mixed with poor asset quality and a 
race for the exit, equaled a catastrophe that Greenspan neither foresaw 
nor correctly diagnosed.  
With this in mind, if seafood futures contracts are going to exist it 
will be because their use will be within the perceived self-interest of the 
market participants. For the successful introduction of seafood futures 
contracts, the perceived self-interest calculus must include the numerous 
benefits and possible drawbacks to creating the contracts, with the 
benefits outweighing the potential deficiencies. 
A.  Benefits of Exchange Traded Seafood Futures  
Seafood futures contracts present numerous advantages over the 
status quo. Such contracts provide an alternative to the cash market, 
allow for producers to reduce price change risk, and perform a price 
discovery function. If successfully implemented, seafood futures 
contracts could have a profound, sustained positive effect on the seafood 
industry and serve to benefit both consumers of seafood and seafood 
sustainability itself.  
1.  Price Risk Management Strategy 
In commodities where supply is constrained and demand is 
increasing, prices can rise and fall quickly depending on the elasticity of 
demand.142  Since “people generally dislike risk and are willing to pay to 
                                            
 140. JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 230 
(2009). 
 141. Geoff Colvin, Alan Greenspan Fights Back, 161 FORTUNE 82 (2010). 
 142. See Sandor, supra note 26, at 127. 
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avoid it (hence the insurance industry),”143 “[m]arkets for hedging price 
risk can develop if there is sufficient price fluctuation, and a basic 
interest for the hedge in both ends of the market.”144  Without price 
volatility, futures contracts are not needed as producers of an underlying 
commodity and end users of the commodity can plan around the cash 
market price, and thus have no need to hedge.145 
Both producers and end users can benefit from futures contracts as 
price risk management strategy tools. As it is now, “supply is difficult to 
gauge [as] . . . ‘sometimes fishermen have a good season, sometimes 
they don’t.’”146  By selling a contract, fishermen and fish farmers can 
theoretically lock in prices.  This gives producers the ability to determine 
their earnings before deciding to capture or harvest seafood, and to weigh 
the pros and cons of even undertaking that activity based upon the costs 
associated with fishing: obtaining the necessary permits, equipment, and 
labor.  Such knowledge could alleviate supply gluts before they occur 
and result in efficient fishing that helps to eliminate fishing when 
economic benefit is insufficient.  The capture seafood industry stands to 
benefit from the introduction of seafood futures contracts to the United 
States; futures contracts could result in improved profitability, a decrease 
in the risk of default on equipment and business loans, and possibly 
conservation of the natural fishing stock as a result of fishing and 
harvesting seafood only when the economics make sense. 
2.  Price Discovery 
Prices change as a result of a myriad of factors that influence market 
participant action. The pricing of a liquid futures contract theoretically 
incorporates all new pertinent information that may affect supply and 
demand of a commodity. This price transparency provides market-wide 
supply and demand data that could allow for financial planning, capital 
expenditure, and an increase (or decrease) in labor requirements.147  The 
price discovery function of a futures market may also create both 
incentives and disadvantages for large seafood businesses, but such a 
                                            
 143. Stout, supra note 32, at 736. 
 144. Grønvik, supra note 4, at 14. See also Kreitner, supra note 38, at 1102-03 
(discussing how people would enter into futures transactions to “prevent losses resulting 
from swings in the price of the commodity”). 
 145. See Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other 
Claims – Regulatory Battles Between CFTC and SEC, 13A COMMODITIES REG. § 28.2, 3 
(2010).  
 146. Rohrlich, supra note 62.  
 147. ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 117. 
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market could increase consumer consumption and benefit the entire 
seafood industry.  The ability of a restaurant chain, canning company, or 
supermarket to offer fresh seafood at a stable, affordable price is 
bolstered by the price certainty provided by seafood futures contracts. 
Lowering the costs of production and price volatility, a futures market 
could result in the decrease of seafood purchase costs for consumers via 
improved efficiency. However, the ability of middlemen and other large 
seafood industry participants to put downward pressure on prices paid to 
fishermen and fish farmers may be diminished as such producers would 
have access to up-to-the minute market pricing and as a result gain price-
negotiation leverage. 
The legitimacy, security, price transparency, and quality assurance 
brought by standardized seafood futures contracts, however, may have 
drawbacks for lawyers. Once a futures contract is vetted by exchange 
lawyers, approved by the CFTC, and reviewed by a lawyer for each 
market participant, the need for lawyers significantly diminishes as a 
result of the standardization of terms and conditions. With the rules and 
regulations imposed by the CFTC and exchanges providing for course of 
conduct and dispute resolution, the traditional breach of contract 
litigation that may result from cash market and forward market 
transactions could dry up. With the possibility of reduced lawyer costs, 
seafood industry market participants could lower the cost of doing 
business and such savings may be passed on to seafood consumers. 
Although there are considerable benefits associated with seafood futures 
contracts, any analysis would be remiss if it failed to identify the possible 
drawbacks associated with the derivatives. 
B.  Drawbacks of Exchange-Traded Seafood Futures Contracts  
Despite the numerous advantages presented by seafood futures 
contracts, there are some disadvantages that must be taken into account. 
First and foremost, much of the seafood industry has little to no 
experience with futures contracts, and the possible risks associated with 
this lack of education cannot be overlooked. One such risk is the marked-
to-market accounting feature of futures contracts. Every day that a 
futures contract is traded, the price theoretically rises and falls. Having 
purchased the contract by only posting margin of “between two and 10 
percent of the total value of the contract,”148 each day that the contract 
increases or decreases in price is marked by a margin call that results in 
either the long or the short market participant posting more margin. This 
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system, which helps to reduce the impact of default by preventing large 
losses from accumulating without additional capital being posted, can 
also cause problems for a cash-strapped market participant. Without a 
proper understanding of the risks involved in futures trading, forced 
liquidation via margin call could wipe out a fisherman’s price hedge and 
result in negative publicity that could have a devastating effect on the 
likelihood of seafood futures contract success. Other potential drawbacks 
to seafood futures contracts could include the possibility of market 
manipulation, overfishing, and other conceivable unknown or uncertain 
drawbacks that could pose considerable risk.  
1.  Market Manipulation  
Futures markets have a long history of successful and attempted 
manipulation.149  Artificially inflating or deflating prices outside the 
realm of supply and demand, futures market manipulation can involve 
spreading false information, cornering the market by controlling a large 
position in a specific commodity (actual or contractual), or squeezing 
short sellers by buying more futures contracts than can be actually 
delivered with the intent to artificially increase price.150  To prevent 
against manipulation, both exchanges and the CFTC have rules and 
regulations that seek to reduce the degree of market manipulation that 
occurs.151  Exchanges are able to self-police through the use of trade 
monitoring, position limits, minimum (tick) and maximum (limit) daily 
price change, and audit trails, while the CFTC has enforcement authority 
that allows it to conduct market surveillance, raise margin requirements, 
limit position sizes, and bring enforcement actions under the Commodity 
Exchange Act.152  Even with such precautions, the chance that 
manipulation could infect seafood futures contracts and result in market 
participation waning represents a considerable threat to a stable contract. 
With the possibility of such an event diminishing trust in the trading 
system to the point that market participants refuse to deal in a new 
contract, such a setback could possibly eliminate the trading of seafood 
futures contracts. 
                                            
 149. See CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 28, at 746-66. 
 150. Shilts, supra note 131, at 12. 
 151. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13, 15 (2006). 
 152. Shilts, supra note 131, at 19-22.  
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2.  Incentivizing Overfishing  
“[P]rice is the mechanism that . . . alert[s] buyers to buy more or that 
would alert . . .  producers to produce more.”153  Supply and demand for 
seafood creates the potentially problematic environmental concern of 
overfishing.  As it is, “[o]n average, each person on the planet is eating 
four times as much seafood as [that person would have] . . . consumed in 
1950.”154  Aided by a more transparent seafood marketplace, one 
negative externality that could theoretically occur from the creation of 
seafood futures contracts is overfishing from increasing demand for 
seafood above even the current trend of increased seafood 
consumption,155 a result that would cause prices for seafood to rise if 
catch shares and fish farming fail to keep up with demand. 
Should market prices become great enough, fishermen will 
theoretically fish until there are no fish left. Called the “race for fish,” 
open access gives fishermen an incentive to fish as fast and efficiently as 
possible to maximize profit.156  The resulting “tragedy of the commons” 
could wipe out fish species if regulatory agencies and fish shares were 
ignored.157  As “rents accrue to whoever goes out and catches the fish,”158 
a fisherman that is willing to violate catch-share limits could profit 
handsomely by selling illegally caught seafood to fishermen that are still 
within their catch-share limits or by selling to seafood dealers that do not 
report their purchases to catch share regulators.159  As a result, the 
incentive to undertake this illegal activity could be greatly increased 
should the price of a given seafood increase substantially.160  
                                            
 153. SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF 
OVERFISHING 33 (Island Press 1999). 
 154. BRIAN HALWEIL, FARMING FISH FOR THE FUTURE 7 (Lisa Mastny ed., Worldwatch 
Institute 2008). See also Rising Wealth of Asians Straining World Fish Stock, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan 24, 2012, at A1 (linking the increased consumption and 
overexploitation of world fish stocks to the rise in wealth and demand for seafood in 
Asia).  
 155. Jennifer Weeks, Fish Farming: Is it Safe for Humans and the Environment?, 17-
27 CQ RESEARCHER FISH FARMING 627 (2007). 
 156. IUDICELLO, supra note 153, at 35-6. 
 157. Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles To Private Ordering In Marine Fisheries, 8 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 12 (2002). 
 158. IUDICELLO, supra note 153, at 85. 
 159. See Bill Trotter, Shrimp Reports Lag; Landings Low, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 
12, 2012, at A1. 
 160. This possible illegal action is somewhat analogous to what occurred when copper 
prices rose substantially. With scrap copper prices around a dollar fifty per pound, thieves 
targeted homes, power lines, and industrial sites to obtain copper to sell as scrap. Manny 
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With the possibility that consumer outcry and seafood industry 
lobbying could influence regulators to raise catch-share limits, seafood 
species may become unable to reproduce fast enough to meet human 
consumption.161  For the fishing industry, higher prices might bring about 
the destruction of the natural resource on which the industry relies, while 
at the same time hastening the arrival of widespread fish farming. A 
competitive seafood futures marketplace by no means guarantees the 
increase in the price of seafood, but such an increase is a possibility that 
must be explored. Considering the efficiencies that can be created and 
the incentives that such a marketplace can create to only fish or harvest 
fish when the economics make sense, it is conceivable that price will 
increase and decrease substantially, guided by the invisible hand upon 
which Alan Greenspan unfortunately relied.162 
3.  Danger of the Unknown  
Murphy’s Law dictates that what can go wrong, will. To help 
mitigate the effects of the inevitable problems that will arise, those 
problems must be identified in advance. For example, there will be a 
decrease in the flexibility of contractual terms and delivery times as 
independent contracting between fishermen/fish farmers and 
middlemen/end users is replaced by “rigid, standardized contracts” 
involving third-party investors.163  Additionally, reputation-based long-
term business relationships, which currently permeate the seafood 
industry, will no longer provide a basis for judging quality because the 
futures market involves trades cleared by a clearinghouse, where seafood 
is objectively graded.  
Furthermore, output risk (such as engine failure and significant 
weather events), become all the more damaging when rigid futures 
contracts are involved─especially where they contain delivery default 
                                                                                                  
Fernandez & Dan Frosch, In a Summer Heat Wave, Making Off With The Cool, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/ 
12heat.html?pagewanted=all.  Causing considerable damage for even relatively small 
amounts of copper, the rise in copper pricing indirectly caused substantial property theft 
and property destruction around the United States. Id.  Taking a cue from the results of 
the rise in copper prices, creating a transparent cash and futures market in seafood will 
have unintended consequences, the results of which cannot be fully predicted. 
 161. This assumes that catch shares are currently set at a sustainable limit.  
 162. Robert H. Frank, Flaw in Free Markets: Humans, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/business/economy/13view.html.  
 163. Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 75 (2011). 
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clauses. Depending on the contractual language, fishermen or fish 
farmers might have to buy in the cash market to cover their obligations to 
deliver seafood should a catastrophic event occur.164  Although a force 
majeure clause165 could be considered, the end result being that the clause 
frees both parties from their contractual obligation,166 such a clause is 
likely ill-suited for a fully functioning futures market due to the 
uncertainty of performance and delivery that such a contractual clause 
could create. 
Although it is pointed out as a possible benefit of futures contracts, 
the (perceived) decreased need for legal counsel can also have potential 
drawbacks and side effects.  Beyond the unemployment potential for 
lawyers, if market participants decide not to consult attorneys before 
entering into each and every futures contract, such participants might 
cause problems for themselves as the terms and conditions of certain 
futures contracts can change as do tax treatment, CFTC regulations, and 
State and Federal law.  
Beyond the aforementioned drawbacks, even the best intentions can 
lead to unforeseen negative results. Weighing the foreseen benefits 
against the foreseen drawbacks, seafood futures contracts, on paper, have 
considerable upside potential. Whether this upside will be realized 
depends upon the will of the seafood industry and whether an exchange 
(or individuals willing to start an exchange) recognizes the monetary and 
social value that seafood futures contracts represent. Lurking in the 
background is the failure of shrimp futures contracts and the persistent 
inability of humans to accurately predict future problems that have, or 
have not, been encountered in the past. 
V.  SEAFOOD FORWARD AND FUTURES CONTRACTS 
Futures contracts often fail due to a lack of liquidity and the failure 
of the contracts’ benefits to outweigh the contracts’ drawbacks. For 
seafood futures contracts to be successful, the fishing industry and end 
users must accept the value that financial markets can contribute to their 
self-interest. For this acceptance to occur, a limited rollout of a few 
seafood futures contracts should occur in a location that produces a 
sufficient supply of the seafood to meet the demand for physical 
                                            
 164. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 4.  
 165. A force majeure is an event outside of the control of a market participant that 
makes payment or delivery impossible. 
 166. See INTERNATIONAL SWAPS & DERIVATIVE ASSOCIATION, ISDA 2002 MASTER 
AGREEMENT (SAMPLE) 8-10 (2002). 
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delivery. One place to start might be with lobster futures contracts in 
New England, where significant marine trapping occurs. Fish produced 
via fish farming might also provide a supply of seafood to meet demand 
for physical delivery of certain species of fish.  In creating seafood 
futures contracts, market participant trust, industry acceptance, and a 
vibrant cash market, are all necessary to obtain sufficient liquidity for a 
fully functioning futures market.  
1. Market Participant Trust 
To encourage market participant trust, strict quality-control standards 
and a program requiring third-party grading of seafood before delivery 
must be implemented to try and overcome the traditional buyer’s desire 
to inspect the catch as a form of quality control.167  This program could 
also be extended to provide consumers and end users with more 
information about the product they are about to consume and to help 
create demand for a specific, premium priced seafood.168  
Past futures market failures also must be overcome as that history 
could undermine belief in the potential success of seafood futures 
contracts. Although creating seafood futures contracts with valuable 
underlying seafood is important, the MGE failure indicates that having a 
valuable commodity does not guarantee success.169  The MGE failure 
must be overcome by incorporating MGE mistakes into a new set of 
contracts.  
Although seafood futures contracts should consider non-par delivery 
because it can promote liquidity within a contract, non-par delivery can 
also cause severe mistrust within a futures market, as evidenced by the 
MGE shrimp contract failure.170 Arbitraging the spread between a non-
par delivery penalty and the price of a less valuable size shrimp has the 
potential to damage trust between market participants. Once bitten, twice 
shy, the incentive to participate in a market that has failed to provide for 
the needs of all market participants is diminished even after just one bad 
experience. Any new market must seek to prevent this from occurring, 
preferably by utilizing “single delivery contracts . . . that could improve 
the hedging effectiveness”171 of the futures contracts. Accompanying the 
                                            
 167. ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 113. 
 168. Such labeling could include information about where seafood was caught or 
farmed and whether farm-raised seafood was “organically” raised. Id. at 194-96. 
 169. Id. at 56. 
 170. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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element of obtaining market participant trust is the requirement that the 
seafood industry accept the use of futures contracts as a means of doing 
business. 
2.  Industry Acceptance  
For a successful seafood futures contract, such contracts must be 
adopted and shaped by both commercial product users and producers like 
fishermen and fish farmers. Being that “the success of a contract is 
largely dependent on its liquidity, i.e., the volume and open interest it 
attracts,”172 the more participation that can be garnered, the more likely it 
will be that the futures contract will be successful. Getting a large group 
of producers and end users to change by beginning to utilize seafood 
futures contracts presents one of the greatest challenges to the successful 
creation of the contracts.  
Presenting an equally challenging problem is that some of the larger 
industry consumers of seafood already have long-term pricing programs 
in place to hedge against price volatility.173  These include Darden 
Restaurants,174 Tyson, Hormel, Smithfield, Kraft, ConAgra,175 and Legal 
Sea Foods.176  Recruiting large businesses, like those listed above, could 
lend credibility to seafood futures contracts and lead many smaller 
businesses to follow the larger businesses into the futures market.177  The 
buyer concentration that a few large companies could bring to a new 
                                                                                                  
BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FISHERIES ECONOMICS AND 
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 174. See Sanders & Pennings, supra note 87, at 413.  
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seafood futures contract market, however, could actually make the 
market less active (less liquid). Therefore, there is a delicate balancing 
between the need for liquidity and the need for large industry leaders to 
utilize the contracts that must occur for the success of a new contract.178  
With the goal of making the use of futures contracts part of doing 
business in the seafood industry, the ability to offer enough deliverable 
seafood to support futures contracting is essential to lending credibility to 
the contract and to getting CFTC approval. To obtain deliverable 
seafood, fishermen and fish farmers must buy into the benefits of such 
contracts, and this objective can be furthered by making sure that those 
market participants who will be using a particular contract have a voice 
in the creation of the contracts terms.179 
a. The Problem of Getting Fisherman on Board  
The seafood industry generally lacks experience with futures 
contracts and “the success rate of new contracts is rather poor . . . [in] 
industries that are new to futures trading.”180  This creates a threshold 
problem of overcoming tradition, and possibly stubbornness, when it 
comes to attempting to get market participants to adopt seafood futures 
contracts as a common business practice.181  Although, if properly 
hedged, fishermen could take considerable price risk out of their business 
equations.  It is possible that some fishermen will refuse to participate in 
a forward or futures contracting market due to the hope of obtaining 
higher prices in the cash market at a later time. Furthermore, expecting 
fishermen to add additional business responsibility to their workload 
without clearly established economic benefit is unrealistic. Thus, 
education about the benefits of seafood forwards and futures contracts as 
well as increased profitability with less risk must be offered. A large-
scale recruiting program should be put in place that offers zero or very 
low transaction costs for a short period of time. Complementing such a 
program, a top-notch customer service center must be in place that 
sponsors educational workshops and handles questions posed by 
individuals looking for information on the futures contract offerings.  
                                            
 178. See Brorsen & Fofana, supra note 71, at 138. 
 179. Gray, supra note 86, at 117-19.  
 180. Sanders & Manfredo, supra note 5, at 506-07. 
 181. “The usual seafood trading practices in the cash markets may suggest that a large 
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transparent cash markets and futures contracts.” Martinez-Garmendia & Anderson, supra 
note 72, at 988.  
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One way that Fish Pool ASA gets around members’ lack of 
education with futures contracts and electronic trading is by working 
closely with those members and allowing members to place orders by 
calling or emailing Fish Pool ASA.182  Pairing customer service and 
educational programs with an easy-to-use electronic trading platform run 
by a fully operational exchange and clearinghouse will create an end 
product that will seek to gain the trust of market participants and serve as 
a bottom-up web of producers that can support fully functioning delivery 
options. 
b.  Fish Farmers 
“[Y]ear-round availability, consistent quality, and [a] relatively 
predictable supply of aquacultural products has expanded the market and 
reduced some of the volatility associated with the seafood trade.”183  
With a predictable catch, more control over the process, and ownership 
rights,184 aquaculture presents a possibly sustainable resource of food and 
a deliverable product that could be contractually traded.  But fish farming 
is not without its problems.  
Although human control of farmed seafood might seek to replicate 
human control of domestic meat animals like chickens, cows, and pigs, 
there are still numerous risks for seafood farmers.185  Fish farming 
narrows the “base of genetic diversity” making fish “increasingly 
susceptible to disease.”186  Disease can affect seafood prices worldwide187 
and can destroy fish farmer profitability, a possibility that leads to the 
use of antibiotics that could have a negative effect on humans who 
consume the farmed seafood.188  Like domesticated land-based animals, 
fish can create an enormous amount of waste pollution, with one salmon 
farm possibly producing as much fecal matter as 65,000 people.189  
Another risk of fish farming is the potential for escape of non-native 
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farmed fish competing with native fish for food,190 causing damage to 
already stressed ecosystems that could, at least theoretically, lead to 
liability for fish farmers.191  Also presenting a problem is the 
contamination of farmed fish with chemicals or toxins ranging from a 
spill in the area of open ocean container fish pens to industrial waste 
discharge.  This raises the risk that an entire “crop” of fish could be 
destroyed.192  These risks, although diminished if seafood is contained 
and farmed in pens on land, can have the same potentially disastrous 
effect that a large storm or engine failure could have on fishermen. 
Even though the risks are substantial, with the demand for seafood 
increasing193 and capture fishing limited by natural supply and fishing 
quotas,194 aquaculture presents a solution to prevent higher prices and a 
fish supply problem.  Predicted to increase by 70% over the next twenty 
years,195 fish farming’s value is illuminated by the changes it has brought 
to the salmon industry.  Whereas wild salmon have fishing seasons that 
can result in salmon supply gluts, such oversupply and then undersupply 
problems have been eased by salmon farming.196  Today, only 5% of the 
salmon that humans eat is wild caught and 95% is farm raised.197  
Resulting in cheaper prices for consumers and less overfishing of wild 
salmon,198 salmon farming has numerous benefits including a stable 
supply of fish to support seafood futures contracts. 
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c.  Benefits for Fishermen and Fish Farmers 
Like “[a] farmer [is] . . . in the business of growing crops, rather than 
betting on the price of wheat,”199 a fisherman is in the business of 
catching fish, rather than betting on the price of seafood.  Locking in 
profits via futures contracts could provide an added incentive to fish and 
make for an overall more successful fishing industry.  By providing 
“menu stability,”200 fish farmers and fishermen actually share quite a few 
similarities with agricultural farmers, who have experience with using 
futures contracts to bolster their businesses.  “Just as farmers bring wheat 
to market, fisher[men] bring fish to market.”201  Both farmers and 
fishermen sell their goods to support themselves and continue their 
trades.  Owning their own labor, both farmers and fishermen must make 
large equipment expenditures, buy large quantities of seed or bait, and 
are significantly affected by the price of oil.   
Producing a product that ends up as food,202 farmers, fishermen, and 
fish farmers all could benefit from futures contracts.  However, only 
agricultural farmers that grow certain commodities have access to 
corresponding futures contracts in the United States.  One reason that this 
may be the case is that agricultural farmers have a greater degree of 
control over production as they generally hold property rights to the land 
on which crops are grown. 203  Fishermen, on the other hand, have no 
ownership right to the ocean, have a catch-share right to a certain amount 
of seafood, and have a less predictable amount and quality of final 
product as a result of having to actually capture fish.  Fish farmers 
overcome this differentiation to a certain extent, as they have property 
rights and a greater degree of production control that makes farmed fish a 
more predictable, thus, deliverable commodity.  A combination of 
farming and fishing, the success of fresh farm-raised salmon futures in 
Norway illustrates the possibilities presented by farmed seafood in the 
United States. 
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3.  Vibrant Cash Market  
“Seafood trading is a highly disaggregated market in which 
individual traders’ bids are generally not made public.”204  This structure 
presents a considerable obstacle for a seafood futures contract as a lack 
of public pricing information can result in a lack of correlation between 
cash market pricing of seafood and futures contract pricing of seafood.205  
This results in an opaque marketplace where some industry participants 
possess informational advantages, which can lead to pricing 
manipulation.  Day-to-day pricing based upon what a middleman, 
distributor, or retail seafood store is willing to pay, can leave many 
producers guessing as to the fair price of their seafood and does not 
appear to present the transparent price discovery of a system conducive 
to a fair and efficient marketplace.  Auctions or other competitive 
bidding marketplaces that do provide a more transparent marketplace do 
exist in the current state of the seafood industry.  But if volume declines 
at the Portland Fish Exchange serve as any indication,206 this system is 
not thriving but instead declining.  
Since an “active cash market is required for a futures contract to be 
successful,”207 establishing a vibrant, transparent cash market where one 
does not exist, is a necessity for bringing about the creation of seafood 
futures contracts.  To do this, an electronic marketplace could provide 
fishermen, fish farmers, middlemen, and end users access to up-to-the-
second seafood pricing.  To build such a system, both buyers and sellers 
would need to be recruited, a potentially time consuming process fraught 
with uncertainty.  Overcoming the traditional seafood buyer’s disposition 
to inspect the “catch,” and the likely mistrust that will exist of the new 
and unknown, will be essential.  
Despite the current marketplace appearing broken and chaotic, the 
current market participants might not either agree or want to change.  
The reality of the current situation for fishermen is that seafood prices 
will continue to face downward pricing pressure in industries where 
successful seafood farming occurs.208  This leaves fishermen with three 
options: (1) continue to fish for seafood that brings a lower and lower 
price; (2) only fish for seafood that cannot be farmed; or (3) evolve and 
adopt new ways of doing business.  If a vibrant cash market can be 
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established and accepted by the seafood industry, one major obstacle in 
the path of creating successful seafood futures contracts could be 
removed. 
4.  Elements of a Successful Futures Contract 
Already established exchanges represent an ideal location for the 
beginning of trading in seafood futures because they possess resource, 
reputation, regulatory, and information-based advantages over a newly 
created trading marketplace.  However, the largest of the established 
exchanges, the CME Group, is located in Chicago, far from the 
geographic center of seafood-based knowledge, and could suffer some of 
the same geographic problems that the MGE dealt with when shrimp 
futures contracts were traded there in the 1990s. NYMEX, located in 
New York and owned by the CME Group, represents a possible option, 
but its focus on energy and metals futures makes it less than ideal.209  The 
other major futures exchange in the United States, the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE), specializes in online futures trading and has a history of 
experimenting with trading in new futures products. 210  Consequently, 
ICE likely represents the best option of the major U.S. exchanges to 
house a seafood futures contract. 
Although in the age of electronic trading the location of an exchange 
matters little, motivation to create a seafood futures contract and the 
know-how to make the contracts tradable and desirable to the seafood 
industry dictates that considerable coastline infrastructure be established 
for success.  In order to launch such a product, an individualized effort 
that is outside the major exchanges might be required before the major 
exchanges would consider housing the futures contracts. 
In an attempt to follow the success of the Norwegian fresh salmon 
futures contracts, and avoid the failure that was the MGE shrimp futures 
contracts, the following prerequisites are generally considered to be 
factors that contribute to the success of a futures contract and must be 
present for a successful seafood futures contract: price volatility in the 
underlying commodity; homogeneity of the underlying commodity; a 
deep, vibrant cash market; and a well-written futures contract. 211  Even if 
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all of these factors are met, success or failure of a contract might simply 
depend upon whether “hedgers” decide to use, and continue to use, the 
contracts.212 
Following the template established by the plywood futures contract, 
each seafood futures contract (whether the underlying commodity is 
salmon, lobster, shrimp or other high value seafood) must be thoroughly 
researched by an exchange with the know-how and resources to 
eventually house the trading of the contract.  First and foremost, price 
volatility must be present in the underlying seafood for a futures contract 
to be needed, let alone be successful.213  Upon identifying seafood that 
possesses sufficient price volatility, a feasibility study must be 
undertaken and seafood industry participants and experts must be 
consulted and solicited.  This research and development could take years 
to weave together a supporting cast of market participants and acceptable 
contractual details. 
Drafting the futures contracts presents a whole host of problems.  
Every clause from delivery requirements to individual species definitions 
must be vetted and researched to ensure fairness and increase 
desirability.  Simulations of contract use must be performed to prevent 
manipulation and the unfair use of particular contract terms that impede 
the general desirability of the overall contract.  After investing time and 
money in the form of man-hours, attorney fees, and staff research, 
whether or not a contract may be traded ultimately comes down to 
whether staff members at the CFTC recommend approval.214 
Acquiescing to most demands made by the CFTC, the contract, upon 
approval, can be traded. Despite the fact that the process appears to be 
completed, the contracts should continue to be tweaked, changed, and re-
approved, in an effort to create a contract in which all market participants 
have trust and confidence in. 
By developing a bottom-up (as opposed to top-down) system built 
with a web of fishermen and end users held together by an electronic 
trading system, increased price transparency in the cash market can be 
established.  The key will be for buyers, such as end users and 
middlemen, and sellers, such as fishermen and middlemen, to realize that 
it is in their best interests to enter the market.  
Utilizing aquaculture and the predictability that it can bring in terms 
of costs and delivered seafood product could bring a greater degree of 
certainty to the standardization process.  The combination of 
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 213. See id. at 131. 
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aquaculture’s farming mentality with the newer quality of its existence 
lends itself more readily to the use of long-term contracts.  Slowly 
standardizing forward contracts, backed by a uniform supply of seafood, 
while attempting to overcome the traditional seafood buyer’s disposition 
to inspect the “catch,” the goal will be to establish trust and liquidity in a 
forward market.  With transparency established in the electronic cash 
market and forward contracting markets, seafood futures contracts 
become a very real, and possibly very successful, opportunity. Assuming 
that an exchange can be found or created to house the contracts, and the 
CFTC approval is obtained, seafood futures contracts could begin to be 
traded.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Seafood futures contracts possess the potential to revolutionize the 
fishing business from a business that is at the mercy of the ebb and flow 
of price movements, to a business in which fishermen can lock in 
profitability before leaving the dock. Futures contracts not only provide 
an alternative to the cash market, but they also allow producers to reduce 
their price change risk. The contracts, if properly utilized, have the 
potential to create a profound, sustained positive effect on the seafood 
industry that could serve to benefit both consumers of seafood and 
seafood sustainability.  Resulting in improved profitability and the 
possible conservation of the natural fishing stock by fishing and 
harvesting seafood only when the economics make sense, the seafood 
industry, the oceans, and natural resources in general, stand to benefit 
from the re-introduction of seafood futures contracts in the United States. 
